Este trabajo tiene como objetivo examinar cómo el legado kantiano de la razón crítica sigue vigente, pues se sostiene en un imperativo teórico fundado en la autonomía. Tal como argumento, este imperativo «categórico-teórico» se estructura gracias a la primacía de la razón práctica por sobre la razón teórica. El ensayo está estructurado en tres secciones. En la primera discuto brevemente el compromiso con la verdad propio de la ética de Sócrates y Platón, quienes inauguran el racionalismo crítico, según Popper. Luego, (...) en la segunda sección examino la filosofía kantiana y su propuesta, la cual ciertamente influye en el «Tratado contra el Método» de Paul Feyerabend. Finalmente, en la tercera sección, analizo la conexión entre razón crítica y razón teórica. En particular, muestro que la primera gobierna la segunda, y que la autonomía es parte de la naturaleza racional humana. Dicha naturaleza ciertamente explica por qué la razón crítica sigue vigente en la época contemporánea. (shrink)

En este trabajo examinamos el tópico de la responsabilidad en el derecho penal internacional a la luz de la filosofía de John Searle, y del fallo dictado por la Corte Penal Internacional en el caso de Thomas Lubanga. En el primer acápite analizamos la declaración de responsabilidad penal en función de la teoría de actos de habla de Austin y de Searle, tratándola como un acto ilocucionario cuyo significado es dependiente de un marco institucional específico. Luego, en el segundo acápite, (...) mostramos de qué forma tal marco puede reconstruirse como un ejemplo paradigmático de la realidad social construida descrita por Searle, especialmente en virtud del nexo entre mente, lenguaje y sociedad. A nuestro juicio, los conceptos de intencionalidad colectiva, atribución de funciones de estatus y poderes deónticos son fundamentales para entender tal nexo. En efecto, tal como argumentamos en la tercera sección, los sistemas de poderes deónticos asociados al derecho internacional no solo explican la aparición de Tribunales penales internacionales, como la Corte Penal Internacional, sino además el carácter imprescriptible de los crímenes de lesa humanidad. Los acuerdos internacionales que promueven y protegen los derechos humanos, y que tratan la imprescriptibilidad de aquellos crímenes, son objeto de análisis en la sección final, en donde exponemos algunas reflexiones finales a partir del caso Lubanga. (shrink)

En este ensayo argumento que, en la ontología social de John Searle, existe un círculo virtuoso entre la cooperación, las instituciones y los poderes deónticos. Son categorías de la realidad social que se retroalimentan y fortalecen mutuamente. La primera sección es introductoria a los conceptos y problemas aquí tratados, mientras que la segunda versa sobre el abecé de la ontología social. En la tercera sección abordo cómo las instituciones están ligadas a prácticas sociales; es decir, las primeras de alguna manera (...) sintetizan la existencia de las segundas. Sin instituciones no podría haber ciertas prácticas, y estas necesariamente llevan a la creación de instituciones. Finalmente, en la última sección argumento acerca de la existencia de un círculo virtuoso entre la cooperación (y la confianza), las instituciones y los poderes deónticos en la realidad social. Es decir, sostengo que existe un fenómeno de retroalimentación y de fortalecimiento mutuo, en tanto la existencia de una categoría fortalece la existencia de las demás categorías. (shrink)

Pese a su uso e importancia, no hay investigaciones semánticas sobre los pseudónimos. Aunque resulta claro que los nombres ficticios son importantes en la definición de la identidad de un artista, no ha habido mayor investigación sobre el rol que desempeñan. Aquí, justamente intento mostrar que son fundamentales en el arte, porque permiten crear la identidad de un personaje, pero ello ocurre principalmente en el mundo social. Dada la escasez de investigaciones sobre los pseudónimos y sobre su conexión con la (...) identidad, este artículo muestra: i) que no pueden ser designadores rígidos kripkeanos; ii) que la identidad que conllevan es puramente artística, y no metafísica. En la primera sección, apoyo parte de la propuesta de Kripke acerca de los designadores rígidos: los nombres propios, como tales designadores, deben analizarse a la luz de los mundos posibles; esto es, en términos de cómo podrían haber resultado las cosas de otra manera. En la segunda sección, examino los antecedentes y las consecuencias de que dichos nombres sean designadores rígidos. En la tercera, en cambio, argumento que los pseudónimos no pueden ser designadores rígidos como los nombres propios. Dicha conclusión es alcanzada a partir de la variación de un experimento mental kripkeano, uno que versa sobre Dios y el esfuerzo de Él para crear objetos. En la sección final muestro que los pseudónimos, en vez de designar rígidamente, crean personajes en el mundo social. Por ello la identidad que conllevan no es interna a los objetos; por el contrario, es un tipo de identidad que solo pertenece al mundo social. (shrink)

En este artículo argumento que, pese al llamado “escepticismo cartesiano”, el significado y alcance de la refutación cartesiana del escéptico y del ateo pueden comprenderse a la luz de tres hitos metafísicos. En la primera sección examino de qué forma este filósofo emplea argumentos escépticos como método, no como fin. Tal como enfatizo, el cogito es el punto en que la duda hiperbólica debe detenerse. Luego, en la segunda sección, discuto por qué Descartes es contrario al fideísmo. Debido a que (...) este se relaciona con el escepticismo, y con la imposibilidad de probar la existencia de Dios, Descartes prueba que Él existe. Sostengo, en la sección final, que Dios es garante de la certeza epistemológica, incluso en el caso de las ideas claras y distintas, cuya confiabilidad pareciera en peligro debido a la hipótesis escéptica del genio maligno. Según el francés, entonces, probar que Dios existe es necesario para garantizar el conocimiento cierto, y es base para inferir la existencia del mundo externo. Los tres hitos, entonces, parecen suficientes para delimitar el sentido y alcance del llamado escepticismo cartesiano. (shrink)

This paper examines an insoluble Cartesian problem for classical AI, namely, how linguistic understanding involves knowledge and awareness of u’s meaning, a cognitive process that is irreducible to algorithms. As analyzed, Descartes’ view about reason and intelligence has paradoxically encouraged certain classical AI researchers to suppose that linguistic understanding suffices for machine intelligence. Several advocates of the Turing Test, for example, assume that linguistic understanding only comprises computational processes which can be recursively decomposed into algorithmic mechanisms. Against this background, in (...) the first section, I explain Descartes’ view about language and mind. To show that Turing bites the bullet with his imitation game, in the second section I analyze this method to assess intelligence. Then, in the third section, I elaborate on Schank and Abelsons’ Script Applier Mechanism (SAM, hereby), which supposedly casts doubt on Descartes’ denial that machines can think. Finally, in the fourth section, I explore a challenge that any algorithmic decomposition of linguistic understanding faces. This challenge, I argue, is the core of the Cartesian problem: knowledge and awareness of meaning require a first-person viewpoint which is irreducible to the decomposition of algorithmic mechanisms. (shrink)

Descartes niega que una máquina pueda ser inteligente, pues los mecanismos son predecibles, inflexibles y limitados. Los seguidores de la Inteligencia Artificial clásica (o IA fuerte) argumentan lo contrario. Pese a esto, Descartes y la IA proponen que la mente podría no estar adscrita a propiedades físicas, posibilidad explorada por el primero a partir de una intuición modal que separa mente y cuerpo. La IA fuerte se acerca a esta tesis cuando reduce la mente a una Máquina de Turing cuya (...) realización física resulta irrelevante. Aunque ambos argumentos presuponen teorías e implicancias diferentes, en este trabajo examino cómo el Funcionalismo resulta compatible con una forma de Dualismo, lo que aleja a la IA clásica del Materialismo que originalmente la inspiró. (shrink)

El Test de Turing es un método tan controvertido como desafiante en Inteligencia Artificial. Se basa en la imitación de la conducta lingüística de humanos, y tiene como objetivo recabar evidencia empírica en favor de la tesis de que las máquinas programadas podrían pensar. Alan Turing, su creador, ha sido catalogado como conductista por la mayor parte de los comentaristas. En este capítulo muestro que no lo es. Por el contrario, Turing es un funcionalista, porque todo el énfasis del juego (...) de la imitación está en el engaño de la máquina hacia los humanos. Por ello el género es importante en dicho juego, al menos en su versión preliminar. (shrink)

Reliabilism, one ofthe most significant naturalized epistemological theories, is an an attempt to justify knowledge on the basis of causal reliable procedures. This theory also seems to be the solution for the skeptic claims. However, as this paper suggests, this theory involves many problems; among others, how experiments could cause justified but false beliefs. This difficulty may reveal that naturalized epistemology cannot answer the radical question of skepticism, because it is not a scientific issue. As Quine thought, it implies a (...) metaphysical puzzle. Thus, every philosopher should face a practical decision: to admit it or to discard it as a non-sense question. (shrink)

En el presente ensayo hago una revisión del término “bomba de intuición”, mostrando la evolución que ha tenido el mismo. En efecto, parece existir un importante cambio de posición, al menos en el pensamiento de Dennett, el cual originalmente trata a algunos experimentos mentales como carentes de virtud epistémica. De hecho, que el término “bomba de intuición” haya sido acuñado por él y Hofstadter una vez aparecido el argumento de la Habitación China de Searle, lleva a pensar que el problema (...) con estas herramientas epistemológicas no es inherente a ellas, sino más bien derivado del problema mente-cuerpo. Pero, esta tesis requiere de algunas precisiones. Dennett ha hecho modificaciones a su tratamiento de las bombas de intuiciones, y ha encontrado para ellas una serie de ventajas para el razonamiento, la imaginación, la argumentación, etc. En consecuencia, en este ensayo muestro la evolución de su tratamiento de las bombas de intuiciones, y enfatizo de qué forma han pasado de ser elementos negativos a positivos en la epistemología de los experimentos mentales. (shrink)

According to John Searle, default positions, i.e., those intelligibility and action presuppositions, are some departing points from which pre-reflective and pragmatic assumptions are made. Postulating such points helps us deal with certain perennial philosophical issues, by leaving them aside. These problems are the existence of the external world, truth and facts, “direct” perception, the meaning of words, and causality. In this article, we argue that those default positions described by Searle constitute a default humanity, and their absence would dehumanize us. (...) This is particularly relevant in a default position: cooperation, which is the basis of collective intentionality and the milestone of human civilization. (shrink)

According to Kemp Smith, Descartes believed that animals were devoid of feelings and sensations. This is the so-called ‘monstrous thesis,’ which I explore here in light of two Cartesian approaches to animals. Firstly, I examine their original treatment in function of Descartes’ early metaphysical approach, i.e., all natural phenomena are to be elucidated in terms of mental scrutiny. As pain would only exist in the understanding, and animals have neither understanding nor souls, Descartes held that they did not suffer. Secondly, (...) I look at the Cartesian late naturalism; specifically, at how animals are subsequently regarded as machines that may suffer. Lastly, I conclude that the ‘monstrous thesis’ is not Cartesian because animals are machines with feelings and sensations. However, Descartes’ surprising indulgence towards humans who kill and eat animals supposes that empathy for beings who may suffer is not necessary. This may raise doubts as to another ‘monstrous thesis.'. (shrink)

In this article, I deal with Searle’s philosophy of society, the last step to complete his philosophical system. This step, however, requires an examination of the context and presuppositions, or default positions, that make possible the key concepts of this new branch of philosophy. In the first section, I address what the enlightenment vision implies. The second section focuses upon how consciousness and intentionality are biological tools that help us create and maintain the social world. In the third section, I (...) explain the importance of the difference between subjectivity and objectivity. Finally, in the fourth section I elaborate upon the default positions: the existence of one world, truth as correspondence to facts, direct perception, meaning, and causation. Importantly, I show how the context and presuppositions of the philosophy of society are an opportunity of interdisciplinary work between philosophy and the social sciences. (shrink)

En este artículo examino dos criterios para la existencia de estados mentales, el de Descartes y el de Turing. Mientras que el primero plantea que las máquinas no pueden pensar en principio, el segundo defiende la inteligencia de máquina. Pese a esto, ambos parecen coincidir en que la decisión sobre la presencia de estados mentales es tomada por alguien que juzga internamente la misma. Si bien ello es esperable del racionalismo cartesiano, en el funcionalismo de Turing es sorprendente. En efecto, (...) ningún comentarista de su Juego de la Imitación repara en el hecho de que los interrogadores son una instancia que no parece reemplazable y, además, que dichos interrogadores aplican un criterio internalista para decidir si están frente a una mente o un computador. Tal aproximación internalista a la mente, argumento, representa una dificultad para que una máquina pase el Test de Turing. Por este motivo concluyo que dicho test no solo no reemplaza la pregunta ¿pueden pensar las máquinas?; adicionalmente traslada de modo dramático el foco del debate a la filosofía de la mente. (shrink)

En este artículo argumentamos que la naturaleza pública o privada de la educación tiene una incidencia directa en las instituciones que conforman la realidad social. Para sustentar lo anterior, en primer lugar discutimos cómo, según Searle, habitamos un mundo de instituciones gobernadas por reglas y poderes deónticos, ontológicamente irreductibles. Luego, postulamos que la intencionalidad colectiva requiere de la confianza para mantenerse, y esta aumenta cuando gobiernan reglas y poderes deónticos en circunstancias normales. Finalmente, planteamos que la educación pública es una (...) institución que, a diferencia de la privada, privilegia el espacio de lo común. Sócrates es un ejemplo de esto, al proponer una filosofía que no solo busca la verdad, sino que además privilegia el reconocimiento de la ley por sobre la satisfacción inmediata de deseos e inclinaciones personales. De todo esto se explica el círculo virtuoso: la educación pública, al ser inclusiva y beneficiar a todos, potencia las instituciones sociales que tutelan ese interés y, dentro de ellas, el servicio público. (shrink)

This article addresses a neglected problem in Searle’s social ontology, namely, how human civilization may collapse. In the first section, I provide the theoretical framework. In the second section, I offer the key elements to understanding Searle’s ontology as well as his philosophy of society, emphasizing the role of constitutive rules and deontic powers. In the third section I examine how they improve trust and co-operation. Global and local natural disasters are distinguished in the fourth section, because the former is (...) sufficient to undermine pacts, promises, constitutive rules and deontic powers, while the latter is neither sufficient nor necessary. In the fifth and final section, I put forward an argument via a thought experiment that allows us to anticipate what would occur if people did not keep promises and pacts, on the one hand, and did not respect constitutive rules and deontic powers, on the other hand. Such events, I argue, would result in the collapse of civilization. (shrink)

En el marco de los estándares profesionalizantes de la academia, con sus “rankings” y productividad científica, las humanidades subsisten. Una explicación de este fenómeno es que, según la ontología social, las razones para la acción independiente de deseos son piezas clave en la educación. Por ello, dichas razones, que constituyen obligaciones, también serían claves para el desarrollo de las humanidades. Aquí examino de qué forma el individualismo y la competencia tensionan la dinámica entre deseos y obligaciones. Ciertamente, el mercado valora (...) más la satisfacción de deseos que la teorización sobre la intencionalidad colectiva y su producto: la civilización humana. (shrink)

Este trabajo examina si la pregunta “¿puede pensar una máquina?” ha sido respondida de manera satisfactoria. La primera sección, justamente, examina el dictum cartesiano según el cual una máquina no puede pensar en principio. La segunda trata sobre una rebelión en contra de Descartes, encabezada por Babbage. A su vez, la tercera describe una segunda rebelión encabezada por Turing. En ambas se examina, primero el lenguaje mentalista/instrumentalista para describir a una máquina programada y segundo, el reemplazo de la pregunta por (...) el Juego de la Imitación. En la cuarta sección sostengo que la evidencia aportada por dicho juego nos devuelve a la pregunta, pese a Turing. Por último, la quinta sección versa sobre cómo la Habitación China de Searle, paradójicamente, apoya el dictum cartesiano, y lo hace porque tal experimento mental se basa en una capacidad mental falible: la introspección. Se concluye que la pregunta acerca de si puede pensar una máquina es derivada de otra pregunta filosófica compleja: la de la naturaleza de lo mental y el problema mente-cuerpo. (shrink)

Los experimentos mentales son dispositivos epistémicos de la imaginación, o de análisis de problemas filosóficos, que recorren las fronteras de aquella, desde el sillón. Dichas fronteras tocan dilemas perennes de la filosofía: cuestiones de la metafísica, como el tiempo, el espacio y la realidad, el problema de la libertad y el determinismo, la naturaleza de la mente, la identidad personal, los argumentos acerca del significado, las posibilidades, fuentes y condiciones del conocimiento, las relaciones entre discurso y lógica, la ética, cuestiones (...) de la filosofía social y política, y la estética. Muchos problemas de la filosofía han sido abordados mediante experimentos mentales, una herramienta útil de la caja de herramientas del filósofo. No todas las herramientas son populares, no obstante. Los experimentos mentales son, pese a sus defensores, falibles, incluso si son argumentos bien planteados. Justamente, este libro recopila artículos con las principales defensas y ataques a los experimentos mentales, especialmente en términos de su confiabilidad para llegar a conclusiones, o bien de su relevancia en términos de su origen: el sillón de la filosofía. Este ha sido vapuleado por los nuevos aires de la filosofía analítica, que trata al sillón como un viejo artefacto del análisis a priori. De hecho, hay posturas que critican a los experimentos mentales por constituir bombas de intuiciones no confiables. Por supuesto, no hay razón irrefutable para aceptar los experimentos mentales y las filosofías de sillón. Pero ¿hay alguna en la filosofía? El libro no pretende convencer al lector del valor de los experimentos mentales y las filosofías de sillón. Por el contrario, su objetivo es formar una imagen propia de estos dispositivos epistémicos, tanto en relación con sus virtudes y limitaciones. Si ello se logra, habrá valido el esfuerzo llevado a cabo en esta compilación de artículos, los que muestran los límites, desafíos y críticas de la experimentación mental desde el sillón. (shrink)

This paper investigates how the simulation of intelligence, an activity that has been considered the notional task of Artificial Intelligence, does not comprise its duplication. Briefly touching on the distinction between conceivability and possibility, and commenting on Ryan’s approach to fiction in terms of the interplay between possible worlds and her principle of minimal departure, we specify verisimilitude in Artificial Intelligence as the accurate resemblance of intelligence by its simulation and, from this characterization, claim the metaphysical impossibility of duplicating intelligence, (...) as neither verisimilarly nor convincingly simulating intelligence involves its duplication. To this end, we argue by a representative case of simulation that, albeit conceivable, Turing’s test for machine intelligence wrongly equates the occurrence of indistinguishable intelligence performance to intelligence duplication, which is grounded in a prima facie conceivable but metaphysically impossible view that separates intelligence from its origin. Finally, we establish the following criterion for evaluating simulation in Artificial Intelligence: simulations succeed in AI if and only if they are able to epistemically persuade human beings that intelligence has been duplicated, that is, if and only if verisimilar simulations can convincingly minimally depart from actual intelligence. (shrink)

El artículo analiza el rol que cumple la confianza en la construcción de la realidad social, argumentando que constituye uno de sus componentes esenciales. Lo es porque hace posible el nacimiento, permanencia y reconocimiento colectivo de las instituciones, así como su iteración y organización en subsistemas.

In support of Descartes’ epistemology, Lex Newman advances the ‘Non-atheistic-knowledge- thesis’, i.e., indefeasible knowledge cannot be gained unless the existence of God is proved. Here I expound the ‘non-atheistic-thesis-of-Cartesian-metaphysics’, which, unlike Newman’s, refers to how four Cartesian metaphysical conclusions require the existence of God. To test whether such conclusions need divine existence, we may ask what would happen if God did not play any decisive role in the Meditations. As I argue, four unpalatable consequences would follow for Cartesian metaphysics, which (...) would ruin Descartes’ plan to refute the skeptic and the atheist alike. (shrink)

This study explores the impact of regional comprehensive factors on talent acquisition using the ASA (Attraction-Selection-Attrition) theory within the context of the automotive industry, employing a structural equation modeling approach. Analyzing data from 308 respondents, the study identifies significant relationships between regional development pole, industry agglomeration, and regional incentives with various dimensions of talent acquisition, including attraction, selection, and retention. The findings reveal that regional development pole and incentives positively influence talent management processes, whereas industry agglomeration has a detrimental effect. (...) These insights are essential for formulating strategies to enhance talent acquisition and retention in the automotive industry by leveraging regional development and incentive mechanisms while addressing the challenges posed by industrial agglomeration. (shrink)

En este trabajo examino cómo el Funcionalismo de Máquina de Turing resulta compatible con una forma de dualismo, lo que aleja a la IA clásica o fuerte del materialismo que la inspiró originalmente en el siglo XIX. Para sostener esta tesis, argumento que efectivamente existe una notable cercanía entre el pensamiento cartesiano y dicho funcionalismo, ya que el primero afirma que es concebible/posible separar mente y cuerpo, mientras que el segundo sostiene que no es estrictamente necesario que los estados mentales (...) se realicen en las propiedades físicas de engranajes y máquinas reales. This article deals with how Turing Machine Functionalism turns out to be compatible with a form of Dualism, which involves that strong AI is not close to the original Materialism that inspired it in the nineteenth century. To support this thesis, I argue that there is a compelling coincidence between Descartes' philosophy and this version of Functionalism, since the former holds that it is conceivable/possible to separate mind and body, while the latter holds that it is not strictly necessary that mental states are realized by the physical properties of real cogs and machines. (shrink)

In this paper, I address the issue of whether the evil demon could have caused the idea of God. In order to determine the capabilities of the evil demon, I perform a thought experiment in which I reaffirm the con-clusion that an imperfect being could have never caused an idea of perfection and infinitude, i.e., the idea of God. The article is divided into five sections and a conclusion. While the first section is introductory, the second looks at the problem (...) of God and knowledge certainty. Elucidating how reality is gradual according to Descartes, in the third section I address the distinction between objective, formal and eminent reality. In turn, in the fourth section, I argue that if the objective reality of God exists, that is, an idea of perfection, the imperfect evil demon could have never caused it. The last section examines the reverse argument of the fourth section, viz, whether God could have caused the existence of evil and imperfection. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend a non-mechanistic interpretation of Kant's philosophy of nature. My interpretation contradicts the robust tradition of reading Kant as a mechanist about nature – or as someone who endorses the view that we can know the internally purposive causality characteristic of organisms has no place in nature. By attending closely to Kant's remarks about the possibility of internal purposiveness in nature and to key premises from Kant's arguments in the Antinomy of Teleological Judgment, we shall see (...) that it is not only plausible, but preferable, to believe that internally purposive things (i.e., organisms) exist in nature. Making room for such a belief leaves Kant with a philosophy of nature that simultaneously aligns with and surpasses the philosophies of nature offered up by his Early Modern predecessors. (shrink)

This paper presents the theory of epistemic safety in relation to three problems: similarity, closure, and generality. Within the neo-Moorean framework of skepticism, the epistemic safety theory complements contextualist theories, where a difference is established between sceptical-thought and everyday contexts. In this way, it is claimed that conviction–i.e., when the bases upon which a belief is constructed remain unquestioned–is an intellectual virtue that makes trustworthy processes in near worlds possible. Finally, the aim of the paper is to highlight the modal (...) difference between beliefs that presuppose near worlds as their core and those that take nearby words as their core. (shrink)

In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as “the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem” (Chalmers, 2018, p. 6). A solution to the meta-problem could shed light on the hard problem of consciousness. In particular, it would be relevant to elucidate whether people’s problem intuitions (i.e. intuitions holding that conscious experience cannot be reduced to physical processes) are driven by factors related to the nature of consciousness, or rather (...) by factors that are independent of consciousness. Whether people hold problem intuitions, and what factors drive those intuitions, are largely empirical questions. However, there is a lack of empirical research on these issues to date. The results of four studies will show that (1) problem intuitions are not widespread, and (2) when they arise, they do so because of factors that are unrelated to the nature of consciousness. This suggests that consciousness is, after all, not so problematic. (shrink)

It is generally assumed that emotion concepts are purely descriptive. However, recent investigations suggest that the concept of happiness includes information about the morality of the agent's life. In this study, we argue that normative influences on emotion concepts are not restricted to happiness and are not about moral norms. In a series of studies, we show that emotion attribution is influenced by whether the agent's psychological and bodily states fit the situation in which they are experienced. People consider that (...) emotions are not just about feeling in certain ways, but also about feeling the right way. (shrink)

John N. Williams argued that Peter Klein's defeasibility theory of knowledge excludes the possibility of one knowing that one has (first-order) a posteriori knowledge. He does that by way of adding a new twist to an objection Klein himself answered more than forty years ago. In this paper I argue that Williams' objection misses its target because of this new twist.

This book talks about the city's reception of philosophy. The purpose of this chapter is to show that philosophy is essential for the maintenance of human security in our cities. The importance of this apology for philosophy is precisely to undo a common but erroneous conception of the nature and disadvantages of this discipline and to politically base its existence. To do this, we will present a characterization of philosophy and some of the most important criticisms of its development within (...) the city, and show that they are not sustainable. Subsequently, we will approach the concept of human security, constructed by Amartya Sen and Obuchi Keizo, and indicate how philosophy is fundamental to its preservation. /// Este livro fala sobre a recepção da filosofia pela cidade. O objetivo deste capítulo é mostrar que a filosofia é essencial para a manutenção da segurança humana de nossas cidades. A importância dessa apologia da filosofia é justamente desfazer uma concepção comum, porém errônea, da natureza e das desvantagens dessa disciplina e fundamentar politicamente sua existência. Para fazermos isso, apresentaremos uma caracterização de filosofia e algumas das mais importantes críticas ao seu desenvolvimento no seio da cidade, e mostraremos que elas não se sustentam. Posteriormente, abordaremos o conceito de segurança humana, construído por Amartya Sen e Obuchi Keizo, e indicaremos como a filosofia é fundamental para a sua preservação. (shrink)

En las dos entregas anteriores abordamos el inicio de la evolución del pensamiento matemático, desde el uso de herramientas matemáticas para problemas de cálculo concreto en la antigua Babilonia, pasando por el inicio de las matemáticas abstractas, las demostraciones y el nacimiento de la “geometría por la geometría” desde la visión religioso-filosófica de Platón y los pitagóricos, hasta la síntesis de ambas visiones en las matemáticas de la India, China y el mundo árabe, que fue la puerta de entrada de (...) las matemáticas a Europa, alrededor del siglo XV. (shrink)

Emergency situations require individuals to make important changes in their behavior. In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, official recommendations to avoid the spread of the virus include costly behaviors such as self-quarantining or drastically diminishing social contacts. Compliance (or lack thereof) with these recommendations is a controversial and divisive topic, and lay hypotheses abound regarding what underlies this divide. This paper investigates which cognitive, moral, and emotional traits separate people who comply with official recommendations from those who don't. In (...) four studies (three pre-registered) on both U.S. and French samples, we found that individuals' self-reported compliance with official recommendations during the COVID-19 pandemic was partly driven by individual differences in moral values, disgust sensitivity, and psychological reactance. We discuss the limitations of our studies and suggest possible applications in the context of health communication. (shrink)

Can we experience emotion without the feeling of accelerated heartbeats, perspiration, or other changes in the body? In his paper “What is an emotion”, William James famously claimed that “if we fancy some strong emotion and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind” (1884, p. 193). Thus, bodily changes are essential to emotion. This is known as the Subtraction Argument. The Subtraction Argument is still (...) used to support Embodied theories of emotion. Proponents of Disembodied theories, however, have different intuitions regarding the role of bodily changes in the experience of emotion. In order to advance this debate, I conducted a series of studies testing people’s intuitions regarding the Subtraction Argument. Results show that, against James’ claims, most people consider that their hypothetical (Study 1) and actual (Study 2) emotions persist in the absence of bodily feelings. Furthermore, Study 1 found that participants’ responses were not related to individual differences in reflection or interoceptive awareness. These results pose a problem for Embodied theories of emotion and challenge extant explanations for the persistence of emotional experience in cases of impaired interoception. (shrink)

En este artículo analizaré algunos aspectos específicos de la obra de Filodemo de Gadara desde la perspectiva de la dimensión retórica del discurso filosófico con el fin de mostrar que el empleo que hace este pensador de ciertos dispositivos retóricos: i) no implica necesariamente un rompimiento con las normativas epicúreas respecto del uso legítimo de la retórica, ii) ni debe leerse como un abandono del proyecto racionalista epicúreo, sino que iii) puede interpretarse como expresión de una concepción sumamente rica y (...) compleja de la racionalidad humana que incorpora las capacidades descriptivas del lenguaje como herramientas esenciales en la transmisión de la información relevante para la toma de decisiones. -/- I aim to examine certain specific aspects of the work of Philodemus of Gadara from the point of view of the rhetorical dimension of philosophical speech in order to show that Philodemus’ use of certain rhetorical devices i) does not necessarily entail a break with Epicurean norms on the correct usage of rhetoric, ii) cannot be read as an abandonment of the Epicurean rationalist project, but iii) may be interpreted as an expression of a rich and complex conception of human reason, a conception that incorporates the descriptive capacities of human language as essential tools for the transmission of relevant information in decision procedures. (shrink)

In emotion research, both conceptual analyses and empirical studies commonly rely on emotion reports. But what do people mean when they say that they are angry, afraid, joyful, etc.? Building on extant theories of emotion, this paper presents four new studies (including a pre-registered replication) measuring the weight of cognitive evaluations, bodily changes, and action tendencies in people’s use of emotion concepts. The results of these studies suggest that the presence or absence of cognitive evaluations has the largest impact on (...) people’s emotion attributions, and that bodily changes and action tendencies are considered to depend on cognitive evaluations. Implications for theories of emotion (concepts) and the interpretation of emotion reports are discussed. (shrink)

Antes de começarmos a falar sobre as leis da natureza, creio que vale a pena explicar algumas coisas sobre o título dessa conferência. Nele, digo que farei uma introdução à metafísica das leis da natureza. Uma introdução, em filosofia, consiste da apresentação de um problema filosófico, indicando as razões pelas quais tal problema é um problema, e das principais posições que tentam resolvê-lo, com suas respectivas dificuldades mais aparentes. Uma introdução não deve dar respostas definitivas sobre qual posição devemos aceitar, (...) nem argumentar decisivamente contra ou a favor de uma posição qualquer frente a outras; mas deve fornecer um quadro geral, para que os filósofos que não conhecem o tema possam começar a sua própria investigação. Dessa forma, o que pretendemos fazer aqui é uma introdução. (shrink)

When we ask ourselves about the meaning of life, two analyses are possible in principle: 1. that we are asking something about the purpose or the reason of being of life or of a life, or 2. that we are asking something the value of life or of a life. At the present article, I do not approach 1 neither the life as a whole, but I take the individual lives in the context of 2. I briefly explain what would (...) be to someone to have an objectivist conception of the meaning of life and what would be to someone to have a subjectivist one; and, then, I try to show how we can think in formulas that can capture the intuitions of those conceptions, without acquiring commitment with none of them. My way is to show that both objectivist and subjectivist conceptions think the meaning of life as related to projects or realizations that fulfill principles of value (the value can be objective or subjective according to the adopted conception), and ten I try to indicate that the projects or realizations from a person’s life come together through a simple sum to make the meaning of life of such a person’s life. The way I suggested for us to find the value of one of those realizations does not seem to present none theoretical problem. But the simple sum of realizations (and/or projects) to represent the value of the meaning of a person’s life simply did not work. That’s because it seems to lack some kind of index that is able to formalize the relations between realizations. Thus, although we couldn’t properly formalize the relation between the realizations that achieve the meaning of someone’s life at a certain moment, we get a good intuitive formalization of the value of a realization and we hope to have started an interesting investigation for future logicians, metaphysicians, mathematicians and theorists of value. (shrink)

These days philosophy teaching in universities follows two main views: the continental philosophy and the analytic philosophy. Each one of those traditions has very different philosophical and pedagogical practices. My objectives in this article are: 1. to show the distinctions between the practices that continental and analytical philosophies cultivated at the universities; 2. to indicate that there is a confusion at the characterization of what is analytic philosophy, and that the critics driven to it are in fact driven to logical (...) positivism; 3. to show that the analytic practices are the ones we consider as genuinely philosophical. / Atualmente o ensino de Filosofia nas universidades tem seguido duas visões principais: a filosofia continental e a filosofia analítica. Cada uma dessas duas tradições diferem bastante em suas práticas filosófica e pedagógica. Meus objetivos neste artigo são: 1. mostrar as distinções entre as práticas cultivadas dentro das universidades pela filosofia continental e pela filosofia analítica; 2. indicar que há uma confusão na caracterização do que é filosofia analítica e que as críticas a ela dirigidas na verdade apontam para o positivismo lógico; 3. mostrar que as práticas analíticas são aquelas que consideramos como genuinamente filosóficas. (shrink)

The aim of the paper will be to analyze the different strategies that the Stoics of the Imperial times designed in order to put our sense of justice on hold, due to the fact that it is deemed responsible for certain attitudes which do not contribute to our search for _eudaimonía_. I will organize such strategies in two groups: the first one corresponds to the strategies that target the idea that an injustice has been committed; the second one corresponds to (...) the ones that aim to show that there are more convenient attitudes towards injustice than the demand for punishment or the desire for revenge. I will end by pointing at the difficulty of reconciling both sets of strategies, and I will suggest a possible way to account for that difficulty. (shrink)

We intend at this article to show some reasons to think the laws of nature as metaphysically necessary: to distinguish the metaphysical modality from the epistemical modality, and to have an absolute modality to face the relative physical and logical modalities. Lately, we indicate what does it mean to talk about metaphysically necessary laws, distinguishing two kinds of metaphysical modalities, and we account for the question about if the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. The conclusion we get is that (...) the laws, whichever they are, are metaphysically necessary. (shrink)

Are feelings an essential part or aspect of emotion? Cases of unconscious emotion suggest that this is not the case. However, it has been claimed that unconscious emotions are better understood as either (a) emotions that are phenomenally conscious but not reflectively conscious, or (b) dispositions to have emotions rather than emotions proper. Here, I argue that these ways of accounting for unconscious emotions are inadequate, and propose a view of emotions as non-phenomenal attitudes that regard their contents as relevant (...) to one's motivations. (shrink)

It is often claimed that fear has an important epistemological function in making us aware of danger. Reactive theories challenge this view. According to them, fear is a response to real or apparent danger. In other words, real or apparent danger is the reason for which we experience fear. Thus, fear depends on awareness of danger instead of making us aware of danger. Proponents of the reactive theory have appealed to phenomenological and, most prominently, linguistic observations to support their views. (...) In particular, they argue that how we talk about the objects of fear supports the view that fear is a response (rather than a perception), and that how we talk about reasons for fear supports the view that reasons for fear are necessarily evaluative (about danger). Building on systematic linguistic observations in the form of corpus analyses and survey data, we argue that how we talk about the objects of fear and how we talk about reasons for fear do not support the reactive theory. Indeed, these linguistic considerations undermine the reactive theory. Most importantly, they suggest that there are non-evaluative reasons for fear. This is good news for rival theories, like perceptual theories, which hold that emotions have epistemic value in contributing to knowledge of evaluative properties such as danger. (shrink)

Against the epicurean position, the rationality about the preoccupation with death is discussed by the present paper. For this purpose two elemental thesis are proposed. The first one supports that it is rational to worry about death before dying because we conceive the idea of a discourse in which the impossibility of interfere in the world to satisfy our pending goals is lamented. The second thesis is that death afflicts any prejudice only to whom wonders about it, because this question (...) encloses the idea that one transcends by means of the achievement of our purpose, for that it is presupposed that with death the interests and aim are kept constant. (shrink)

Since the automation revolution of our technological era, diverse machines or robots have gradually begun to reconfigure our lives. With this expansion, it seems that those machines are now faced with a new challenge: more autonomous decision-making involving life or death consequences. This paper explores the philosophical possibility of artificial moral agency through the following question: could a machine obtain the cognitive capacities needed to be a moral agent? In this regard, I propose to expose, under a normative-cognitive perspective, the (...) minimum criteria through which we could recognize an artificial entity as a genuine moral entity. Although my proposal should be considered from a reasonable level of abstraction, I will critically analyze and identify how an artificial agent could integrate those cognitive features. Finally, I intend to discuss their limitations or possibilities. (shrink)

Within the framework of the epistemological debate on disagreement, this paper aims to examine the sceptical thesis that holds that, if it is impossible to rationally choose among two excluding positions, the only sensible or rational thing to do is to suspend judgement. The idea that ordinary life does not constitute the source of scepticism is presented, which rules out real disagreement between epistemic pairs as its foundation. Sceptical scenes differ ontologically from everyday scenes, without such ontological difference entailing an (...) epistemic difference, since epistemic practices do not vary from one sceptical scene to other types of scenes. (shrink)

My aim here is to answer the question about why is there something rather than nothing by arguing for the existence of some necessary beings (that, as such, couldn’t not exist) – the space, the time, and the natural basic laws – and by showing that the existence of nothingness is logically impossible. I also try to account for the fact that contingent beings arise from necessary beings by distinguishing between necessary existence and necessary arising, as to answer the question (...) about why is there anything contingent at all and to propose a solution to the Dilemma of Contingency. (shrink)

This paper proposes a view on epistemic relativism that arises from the problem of the criterion, keeping in consideration that the assessment of criterion standards always occurs in a certain context. The main idea is that the epistemic value of the assertion “S knows that p” depends not only on the criterion adopted within an epistemic framework and the relationship between said criterion and a meta-criterion, but also from the collaboration with other subjects who share the same standards. Thus, one (...) can choose between particularist and methodist criteria according to the context of assessment. This position has the advantage of presenting a new perspective concerning both the criterion problem and the problem of inter-contextuality in the evaluation of different epistemic frameworks. (shrink)